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Introduction 
 
&vidence-based medicine and clinical practice guidelines are spontaneous standardization 
movements initiated by the medical profession with the goal of quality improvement and 
cost reduction in health care services since 1970s.  However, as Timmermans and Berg 
point out, “ evidence-based guidelines also represent the farthest-reaching and most direct 
attempts to prescribe and preset the actions of health care professionals.
1”
  With  the 
dissemination and implementation of guidelines in medical professionals’ clinical 
practices, how courts interpret such standards in malpractice litigations would be 
vital to the regulation of medicine and the development of guidelines.   
 
This paper focuses on the influence of evidence-based guidelines on the legal standard of 
care, and proceeds in four parts.  Part I provides a brief introduction of evidence-based 
guidelines, including its origin, purposes and related concerns, and uses ACOG guideline 
as a example.  Part II briefly describes two standards of care used in medical malpractice 
cases—medical custom and reasonable physician standard, along with the duty to stay 
abreast.  Part III analyses the possible influence that guidelines have on different legal 
standards of care, and TIPXTthe challenges that courts may encounter when applying a 
medical standard to determine legal standard of care.  Part IV presents my observations 
and suggestions for court’s future use of evidence-based guidelines.  
 
                                                        
1 STEFAM TIMMERMANS & MARC BERG, THE GOLD STANDARD: THE CHALLENGE OF 
EVIDENCE-BASED MEDICINE AND STANDARDIZARION IN HEALTH CARE 14 (2003).     3 
I. Evidence-based Medicine and Clinical Practice Guidelines 
 
A.  Definitions 
1. Evidence-based Medicine 
Evidence-based medicine (EBM) is a recent standardization movement in the medical 
profession that focuses on “the conscientious, explicit, and judicious use of current best 
evidence in making decisions about the care of individual patients.”
2  The growing body 
of scientific medical research and advances in information technology since the 1990s 
contributes  to  the  accumulation  of  “current  best  evidence,”  which  refers  to  the  data 
produced by strictly controlled medical research, such as randomized, reproducible, and 
double blind clinical trials.
3  As a result, medical knowledge nowadays has a stronger 
basis in scientific evidence than in the past, when a great deal of medical practice was 
based on individual physicians’ experience or consensus.
4 
  
Aiming at quality improvement and cost reduction, EBM promotes a decision-making 
process that relies on the use of current best evidence with physicians’ clinical expertise 
and  patients’  unique  values  and  circumstances.
5   With  the  assistance  of  such  data,  a 
                                                        
2 David L. Sackett et al., Evidence-based Medicine: What It Is and What It Isn’t, 312 BRIT. MED. J. 71, 71 
(1996). 
3 SHARON E. STRAUS ET AL. EVIDENCE-BASED MEDICINE: HOW TO PRACTICE AND TEACH 
EBM 7-8, 31-35 (3rd ed. 2005). 
4 The term ’evidence-based medicine’ was coined in 1992 by a group led by Gordon Guyatt at McMaster 
University, and was often in comparison with “consensus-based or experience-based medicine.” See 
Evidence-based Medicine Working Group, Evidence-based Medicine: A New Approach to Teaching the 
Practice of Medicine, 268 JAMA 2420-5 (1992).  
5 See STRAUS ET AL. supra note 3, at 3-4. A standard EBM thinking process consists of a five-step 
process: (1) converting the need for information (about prevention, diagnosis, prognosis therapy, causation, 
etc.) into an answerable question, (2) tracking down the best evidence through references to the medical 
literature, (3) critically appraising evidence for its validity (proximity to the truth), impact (size of the 
effect), and applicability (usefulness in clinical practice), (4) integrating critical appraisal with clinical   4 
physician  is  better  equipped  with  the  scientific-based  knowledge  to  provide  credible 
diagnoses and prognoses, as well as to better inform patients of the benefits and risks of 
treatments or alternatives.  
2. Clinical Practice Guidelines  
Clinical practice guidelines (CPGs), also referred to as practice parameters and clinical 
pathways, are the most common form of practicing evidence-based medicine. The U.S. 
Institute of Medicine defines ‘clinical practice guidelines’ as “the consensus statements 
that have been systematically developed to assist practitioners and patients in making 
appropriate  healthcare  decisions  for  specific  clinical  circumstance.”
6    With  the 
tremendous volume of medical journals, research reports, and case studies published at a 
surprising rate every year, it is not practical to expect a clinician to conduct an evidence-
oriented search for relevant research prior to every occasion when he or she must render a 
medical  decision.
7   As  a  result,  there  is  a  need  for  a  simpler  and  easier  approach  to 
practicing  EBM,  and  this  fact  helps  explain  the  creation  of  evidence-based  clinical 
practice guidelines.
8 
 
A standard process of developing evidence-based guidelines is as follows.  First, most 
guidelines  target  a  specific  clinical  question,  for  example,  how  and  when  to  order 
                                                                                                                                                                     
expertise and with patients’ unique biology, values, and circumstances, and (5) applying the results to the 
patient and evaluating effectiveness and efficiency for future improvements. 
6 Marilyn J. Field & Kathleen N. Lohr eds., Guidelines for Clinical Practice: From Development to Use, 27 
INST. OF MED (1992); BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND 
PROBLEMS 179 (6th ed. 2008). (Defining ‘guidelines’ further as “standardized specifications for using a 
procedure or managing a particular clinical problem”) 
7 For example, a search using the keywords “evidence” and “clinical research” in PubMed will yield more 
than 5,000 results, and this number is continuously on the rise. See Fig. 1, Jeffrey A. Claridge & Timothy 
C. Fabian, History and Development of Evidence-based Medicine, 29 World J. Surg. 547, 547-48 (2005). 
8 Arnold J. Rosoff, Evidence-based Medicine and the Law: The Courts Confront Clinical Practice 
Guidelines, 26, No.2 Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law 327, 328 (2001).   5 
screening tests, how and when to perform a surgery, or how long a patient should remain 
hospitalized for post-operative care.
9  With the given question in mind, a panel of medical 
experts will conduct a systemic review of current medical literature or meta-analyses of 
statistical data related to the issue, and will then propose a set of recommendations in 
response to the question.  With the help of the recommendations, physicians will be better 
able to render an evidence-based decision.  Moreover, to further facilitate physicians to 
choose and apply appropriate guidelines, the scope of data reviewed and the methodology 
used  will  be  disclosed,  along  with  the  rating  of  recommendation,  which  is  made 
according to the strength of recommendations (level A to C) and the quality of scientific 
evidence supporting such recommendations (level I to III).
10  Therefore, guidelines work 
as a clear roadmap for a physician to efficiently and effectively practice evidence-based 
medicine in the case at hand.  
3. Example: ACOG guideline 
Today, there are currently over 6,000 evidence-based CPGs, if calculated by topic, that 
have been written by more than 270 professional societies listed in the United States 
                                                        
9 Stefan Timmermans & Aaron Mauck, The Promises and Pitfalls of Evidence-based Medicine 24, no.1 
Health Affairs 18, 18-19 (2005). 
10 For the guidelines collected in National Guideline Clearinghouse (NGC), there will be a unified rating 
scheme for the strength of evidence and recommendations as follows: 
For Grades of Evidence: (I-III) 
I: Evidence obtained from at least one properly designed randomized controlled trial 
II-1: Evidence obtained from well-designed controlled trials without randomization 
II-2: Evidence obtained from well-designed cohort or case-control analytic studies, preferably from more 
than one center or research group 
II-3: Evidence obtained from multiple time series with or without the intervention. Dramatic results in 
uncontrolled experiments could also be regarded as this type of evidence. 
III: Opinions of respected authorities based on clinical experience, descriptive studies, or reports of expert 
committees 
Levels of Recommendations (A-C) 
Level A - Recommendations are based on good and consistent scientific evidence. 
Level B - Recommendations are based on limited or inconsistent scientific evidence. 
Level C - Recommendations are based primarily on consensus and expert opinion.   6 
National  Guideline  Clearinghouse  (NGC).
11   To  provide  a  better  illustration  of  an 
evidence-based guideline, consider the example below, which is an excerpt of a guideline 
entitled “Vaginal Birth After Previous Cesarean Delivery,” published by the American 
College  of  Obstetricians  and  Gynecologists  (ACOG)  in  2010.
12   ACOG  conducted 
literature research by referencing the MEDLINE database, the Cochrane Library, and 
ACOG’s own internal resources to review relevant articles published between January 
1985 and February 2010, and made the following recommendation: 
 
Major Recommendations: 
The following recommendations are based on good and consistent 
scientific evidence (Level A): 
  Most women with one previous cesarean delivery with a low 
transverse incision are candidates for and should be counseled about 
vaginal birth after cesarean delivery (VBAC) and offered a trial of 
labor after previous cesarean delivery (TOLAC). 
  Epidural anesthesia for labor may be used as part of TOLAC. 
  Misoprostol should not be used for third semester cervical ripening or 
labor induction in patients who have had a cesarean delivery or major 
uterine surgery. 
 
                                                        
11 The National Guideline Clearinghouse (NGC) is a publicly available database of evidence-based clinical 
practice guidelines that provides Internet users with free online access to guidelines at 
http://www.guideline.gov.  
The NGC is produced by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ, formerly the Agency 
for Health Care Policy and Research [AHCPR]), in partnership with the American Medical Association 
(AMA) and the American Association of Health Plans (AAHP) Foundation, with the mission to provide 
physicians and other health professionals, health care providers, health plans, integrated delivery systems, 
purchasers, and others an accessible mechanism for obtaining objective, detailed information on clinical 
practice guidelines and to further their dissemination, implementation, and use.  The AHCPR was active in 
developing practice guidelines until 1999, when it evolved into its current relatively passive role of 
coordination and the administration of the NCC because criticism of those guidelines rested largely on cost 
concerns. See 42 U.S.C. section 299b-1(a)(1994); http://www.ahrq.gov/ ; 
http://www.guideline.gov/browse/by-topic.aspx 
12American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG), Vaginal birth after previous cesarean 
delivery, Washington (DC): American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG), 2010 Aug. 14 
(ACOG practice bulletin; no. 115) Available at: http://www.guideline.gov/content.aspx?id=23853   7 
The following recommendations are based on limited or inconsistent 
scientific evidence (Level B): 
•  Women with two previous low transverse cesarean deliveries may be 
considered candidates for TOLAC. 
•  Women with one previous cesarean delivery with a low transverse 
incision, who are otherwise appropriate candidates for twin vaginal 
delivery, may be considered candidates for TOLAC. 
•  External cephalic version for breech presentation is not 
contraindicated in women with a prior low transverse uterine incision 
who are at low risk for adverse maternal or neonatal outcomes from 
external cephalic version and TOLAC. 
•  Those at high risk for complications (e.g., those with previous 
classical or T-incision, prior uterine rupture, or extensive transfundal 
uterine surgery) and those in whom vaginal delivery is otherwise 
contraindicated (e.g., those with placenta previa) are not generally 
candidates for planned TOLAC. 
•  Induction of labor for maternal or fetal indications remains an option 
in women undergoing TOLAC. 
•  TOLAC is not contraindicated for women with previous cesarean 
delivery with an unknown uterine scar type unless there is a high 
clinical suspicion of a previous classical uterine incision. 
 
The following recommendations are based primarily on consensus and 
expert opinion (Level C): 
•  A trial of labor after previous cesarean delivery should be undertaken 
at facilities capable of emergency deliveries. Because of the risks 
associated with TOLAC and that uterine rupture and other 
complications may be unpredictable, the College recommends that 
TOLAC be undertaken in facilities with staff immediately available 
to provide emergency care. When resources for immediate cesarean 
delivery are not available, the College recommends that health care 
providers and patients considering TOLAC discuss the hospital's 
resources and availability of obstetric, pediatric, anesthetic, and 
operating room staffs. Respect for patient autonomy supports that 
patients should be allowed to accept increased levels of risk; 
however, patients should be clearly informed of such potential   8 
increase in risk and management alternatives. 
•  After counseling, the ultimate decision to undergo TOLAC or a 
repeat cesarean delivery should be made by the patient in consultation 
with her health care provider. The potential risks and benefits of both 
TOLAC and elective repeat cesarean delivery should be discussed. 
Documentation of counseling and the management plan should be 
included in the medical record. 
 
 
It is apparent that this set of guidelines targets a patient group—women who have had a 
cesarean  delivery—and  recommends  the  desirable  choice  of  delivery  under  specified 
circumstances.  There are 3 levels of the strength of the recommendation. The level A 
recommendation is based on good and consistent scientific evidence, and the strength of 
the recommendation find expression in words such as “should ” or “should not.”  For 
example,  Misoprostol  “should  not  be  used”  a  certain  type  of  patients.  The  level  B 
recommendations  are  based  on  limited  or  inconsistent  scientific  evidence,  and  the 
expression  used  is  more  flexible  such  as  “may  be  considered©  candidates,  or  “not 
generally  the  candidates  for”  a  certain  treatment.”    In  contrast,  the  level  C 
recommendations, which rest primarily on consensus and expert opinion, are the weakest; 
thus,  the  corresponding  language  is  notably  more  subdued  than  the  aforementioned 
language.    Besides,  level  C  recommendations  often  take  non-medical  factors  into 
considerations, such as the facilities, staffs, and resources available, with the emphasis on 
patient participation.  By adopting such a scale, the guidelines accommodate a greater 
variety  of  circumstances  as  well  as  allow  a  physician  to  maintain  discretion  while 
applying the guidelines to individual cases. 
   9 
B.  Origins and Purposes 
1. Quality Improvement for Reducing Medical-practice Variation  
Evidence  based  guidelines were developed  as  a  response  to  the  problem  of  medical-
practice variation, which came to the public’s attention in the 1980s after the publication 
of a study conducted by John Wennberg.
13  Wennberg’s research shows strikingly high 
geographical  variations  in  treatment  approaches,  the  length  of  in-hospital  stays  in 
intensive-care  units,  and  preference-sensitive  care,
14 which  were  reflections  chiefly  of 
physicians’ preferences and could be traced back to the lack of communication between 
doctors  and  patients  and  patients’  subordination  to  a  physician’s  opinion.
15   Such 
variation, caused concerns about the quality of medical services, and, as Mello argued, 
contributed  to  escalating  health  costs  since  the  1970s.
1617   Even  today,  variation  in 
clinical practices still ranks as the third major concern of the healthcare industry in the 
United States, while rising healthcare costs and unequal access to healthcare rank as the 
first and the second.
18 
 
The recommendations that evidence-based guidelines provide help preventing random 
                                                        
13 John E. Wennberg, Dealing with Medical Practice Variations: A Proposal for Action, 3 Health Affairs 6, 
9 (1984). 
14 Id. (Preference-sensitive care is treatment such as discretionary surgeries for which there are two or more 
valid treatment alternatives, and the choice of treatment involves tradeoffs that should be based on a 
patient’s preference. Wennberg found that variation in elective surgeries is strikingly high: for example, 
surgeons in adjoining counties in Florida may operate at very different levels for the same condition and 
patient.)     
15 John E. Wennberg, Variation in Use of Medicare Services Among Regions and Selected Academic 
Medical Centers: Is More Better?,  874 Commonwealth Fund Pub.4, 4 (2005). 
16 PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 335, 379 (1982). 
(Between 1950 and 1970, national healthcare expenditure grew from $12.7 billion to $71.6 billion (up from 
4.5 to 7.3 percent of GNP), and medical care became one of the nation’s largest industries.)  
17 Michelle M. Mello, Of Sword and Shields: The Role of Clinical Practice Guidelines In Medical 
Malpractice Litigation, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 645, 649-5 (2001). 
18 Timmermans & Mauch, supra note 9, at 19.    10 
errors and reducing the variations that have not been verified by science, which is a 
natural outgrowth of the standardization movement.
19  The value of standardization has 
long  been  recognized  in  modern  times  as  one  of  the  best  methods  for  ensuring  the 
reliability of products and containment of costs.
20  In the medical profession, the idea of 
standardization  has  been  embodied  in  the  standardization  of  medical  education  and 
unified licensing systems, which help to ensure the quality of prospective physicians. 
/PXUISPVHIevidence-based guidelines, standardization improves the quality of medical 
decisions.
21  For example, after the adoption of a clopidogrel-management CPG at the 
California Pacific Medical Center, the preoperative exposure to clopidogrel dropped from 
39% to 6.3%, following a remarkable reduction in chest tube output, blood product use, 
and bleeding complications.
22  For another example, according to research conducted by 
Texas Children’s Hospital in 2009, after the implementation of evidence-based guidelines 
regarding  the  treatment  of  acute  chest  syndrome  (ACS)  in  children  with  sickle  cell 
disease  (SCD),  the  average  length  of  stay  decreased  from  5.8  days  to  4.1  days,  the 
patients’ average clinical respiratory score improved by 44.5%, and the average cost per 
admission decreased from $30,359 to $22,368.
23  
2. Cost Reduction 
Cost reduction is another direct benefit produced by standardization, and is at least as 
                                                        
19 Lynn Etheredge, Perspective: The Need for Evidence-based Health Policy to Address Health Care, w3 
Health Affairs 366 (2003)  
20 Simon C mathews & Peter J. Pronovost, Physician Autonomy and Informed Decision Making: Finding 
the Balance for Patient Safety and Quality, 300 JAMA 2913, 2914 (2008). (Standardization is among the 
best methods available to improve quality and reduce cost of care)  
21 TIMMERMANS & BERG, supra note 1, at 14.   
22 Ley SJ, Quality Care Outcomes in Cardiac Surgery: the Role of Evidence-based Practice, 12(4), AACN 
Clinical Issues, 606-617 (2001). 
23 Crabtree EA et al., Improving Care for Children with Sickle Cell Disease/Acute Chest Syndrome, 127(2) 
Pediatrics 480, 480-488 (2011).    11 
important as quality improvement, particularly insofar as the government has vowed to 
deal  with  rising  healthcare  costs.
24   Evidence-based  guidelines  have  helped  reduce 
healthcare  costs  in  several  ways.    First,  the  guidelines  have  helped  reduce  defensive 
medicine.
25   According  to  research  conducted  by  Mello  and  her  colleagues  on  the 
national cost of the medical liability system in 2008, the cost of defensive medicine was 
as high as U.S. $45.59 billion.
26  The practice of defensive medicine has resulted largely 
from doctors’ fear of medical malpractice lawsuits.
27  Evidence-based guidelines provide 
implicit assurance to physicians that, whenever following a specific guideline, they are 
making desirable medical judgments, thus lessening the physicians’ worries of medical 
malpractice litigation.  Second, facing the FOEMFTTdemand for better and more healthcare 
services in the populationa great number of guidelines also rest on cost-benefit analysis 
methodology in order to prompt physicians to make a cost-effective choice with limited 
resources.
28  As Tucker puts it, clinical-practice guidelines constitute “a powerful tool to 
deliver  a  limited  amount  of  healthcare  to  the  greatest  number  of  people  in  the  most 
effective way.”
29  
                                                        
24 FURROW ET AL., supra note 6, at 349. 
25 The U.S. Congress Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) proposed the most commonly used 
definition of ‘defensive medicine’, which conceptualizes defensive medicine as occurring “when doctors 
order tests, procedures, or visits, or avoid certain high-risk patients or procedures, primarily (but not solely) 
because of concern about malpractice liability.” 
26 See, Michelle M. Mello, Amitabh Chandra, Atul A. Gawande and David M. Studdert, National Costs of 
the Medical Liability System, 29 No. 9 Health Affairs, 1569-1577 (2010). 
27 See T BAKER, THE MEDCIAL MALPRACTICE MYTH (2005); and Taschi Karen-Paz, Liability 
Regimes, Reputation Loss, and Defensive Medicine, 18 MEDLREV 363, 375-376 (2010). But, see David 
Klingman et al., Measuring Defensive Medicine Using Clinical Scenario Surveys, 21 Journal of Health 
Politics, Policy and Law 185, 201-205 (1996) (Klingman and his colleagues argue that defensive medicine 
is motivated by aggressive clinical choices rather than the fear of malpractice liability.)    
28 Rosoff, supra note 8, at 337-38; Mello, supra note 17, at 651-52. 
29 John Tucker, A Novel Approach to Determining Best Medical Practices: Looking at the Evidence, 10 
Hous. J. Health L. & Policy 147, 155 (2009).   12 
3. Patient Participation 
To improve patient-centered medical practices is another important goal of evidence-
based  guidelines.
30   For  example,  in  the  previously  mentioned  ACOG  guidelines, 
patients’  participation  is  specified  particularly  in  the  recommendation  that “ patients 
should  be  clearly  informed  of  such  potential  increase  in  risk  and  management 
alternatives.” Research also shows that, when better informed about the risks, benefits, 
alternatives and outcomes, patients not only better understand the matter at hand when 
making  a  decision,  but  also  have  greater  confidence  in  the  decision.
31   Guidelines 
facilitate the interaction between patients and physicians, which is a win-win situation 
that we are more than happy to see.  
 
Last but not least, evidence-based guidelines work as a strong defense of self-regulation 
in the medical profession, which has long been entrusted with the power and privilege of 
self-monitoring.
32  By adopting evidence-based guidelines, the medical profession has not 
only  consolidated  the  bond  between  medicine  and  science,  but  also  displayed  the 
profession’s spontaneous efforts to keep its promise of pursuing improvements in the 
quality of society.
33 
 
                                                        
30 See STRAUS ET AL., Supra note 3, at 1. (EBM encourages physicians to emphasize patient value and 
consider patients’ unique preferences, expectations, and concerns when making a clinical decision.)  
31 O’Connor AM, Bennett CL, Stacey D, Barry M, Col NF, Eden KB, et al., Decision Aids for People 
Facing Health Treatment or Screening Decisions, 3 Cochrane Database System Review143 (2009). 
32 For a through introduction of the origins and development of the self-regulation of the medical profession 
between 1850-1930, see STARR, supra note 16, at 79-144. 
33 Michelle M. Mello, Using Statistical Evidence to Prove the Malpractice Standard of Care: Bridging 
Legal, Clinical, and Statistical Thinking, 37 Wake Forest L. Rev. 821. 822 (2002); Angel Campell & 
Kathleen Cranley Glass, The Legal Status of Clinical and Ethics Policies, Codes, and Guidelines in 
Medical Practice and Research, 46 McGill Law Journal 473, 476 (2001) (Constructing scientifically 
optimal CPGs is necessary for the credibility of medicine.); Timmermans & Mauch, supra note 9, at 21.   13 
C.  Concerns 
There  are  many  concerns—both  within  the  medical  community  and  outside  it—
associated with the widespread presence of evidence-based guidelines.  First of all, even 
though  the  guidelines  have  achieved  great  success  in  medical  education  and  clinical 
application,  the  medical  profession  has  mixed  feelings  about  them  because  of  their 
potential threat to clinicians’ autonomy.
34  Opponents criticize that guidelines bring about 
“cookbook  medicine”  or  “checklist  medicine,”  which  deprives  doctors  of  the  critical 
discretionary  power  that  is  essential  for  them  as  professionals  because  the  rigid 
application of guidelines ignores the uncertainty in medical practice and depreciates the 
value of clinical judgment.
35  Furthermore, this infringement upon professional autonomy 
is unprecedented because it dictates the content and the details of day-to-day decisions 
rather than set the minimum competence threshold, as licensing and board-certification 
systems have done.”
36 
 
Second, there is still no single authority on practice guidelines, and this vacuum translates 
into the problems of multiple guideline issuers and conflicting guidelines.
37  Although 
professional associations and societies have issued a great majority of the evidence-based 
                                                        
34 Rosoff, supra note 8, at 329. (Some parts of the medical community view EBM as a mixed blessing. 
Some parts of the medical community worry that the spread of CPGs have the potential to turn doctors into 
automatons and lower the quality of health care by subordinating and subverting professional skills and 
judgment.) 
35 RITZER G. THE MCDONALDIZATION OF SOCIETY: AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE 
CHANGING CHARACTER IF CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL LIFE, (1992); B.G.Charlton, Restoring the 
Balance: Evidence-based Medicine Put in Its Place, 3 no.2 Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 87-98 
(1997); TIMMERMANS & BERG, supra note 1, at 19. 
36 Supra note 1. 
37 The Agency for Health Care Policy and Research (AHCPR) was reauthorized under the Healthcare 
Research and Quality Act of 1999, and changed its name to the Agency for Healthcare Research and 
Quality (AHRQ). The Act redefined AHRO’s role from that of an active creator and regulator of evidence-
based guidelines to that of a less active actor in the funding of research and the maintaining of the  
“National Guideline Clearinghouse” database, See, AHQR Reauthorization Fact Sheet, 
http://www.ahrq.gov/about/ahrqfact.htm; http://guideline.gov/ ; Also see supra note 11.   14 
guidelines, managed-care organizations (MCOs) and private insurers have also issued 
guidelines  with  the  predominant  purpose  of  improving  the  effective  use  of  medical 
resources.
38  Because these guidelines are often held as the standard for reimbursement, 
utilization review or physician profiling purposes, in practice, they have had a stronger 
effect  on  physician  compliance  than  the  guidelines  “suggested”  by  professional 
associations.
39  (This problem involves a broader debate about whether it is desirable for 
physicians to implement cost-oriented choices, a topic that is beyond the scope of this 
paper.
40)    Furthermore,  concerns  about  potential  conflicts  of  interests  resulted  from 
funding sources are raised to the guideline generators, including professional associations 
and societies.  In 2010, the National Guideline Clearinghouse/National Quality Measures 
Clearinghouse  (NGC/NQMC)  Core  Editorial  Board  reviewed  the  current  guidelines 
published in NGC, and found out that only 60% of the guidelines have statements about 
the  presence  or  absence  of  potential  conflicts  of  interest.
41   The  problem  of  multiple 
issuers or cost-oriented guidelines might contribute to another problem of inconsistent or 
                                                        
38 Rosoff, supra note 8, at 337-38; Mello, supra note 17, at 651-52. 
39 Jamie Lynn Armitage, Case Note: Pegram v. Herdrich: HMO Physicians as Fiduciaries, 5 DEPAUL J. 
HEALTH CARE L. 341, 360 (2002) ; Mello, supra note 17, at 651-652 (Both conducted by the third party 
payers, utilization review is the evaluation to review physician’s treatment order in order to determine 
whether such care will be reimbursed, and physician profiling is the analysis of a physician’s practice 
pattern to see whether his/her practice is cost-efficient, which might influence physician’s participation in a 
HMO); Timmermans & Mauch, supra note 9, at 21. (Third party guideline might bring result in the further 
”deprofessionalization” of medicine.”) 
40 FURROW ET AL., supra note 6, at 199. (The medical profession has long won great respect from 
patients and society in general because there is a common conception that doctors engage an honorable 
work by dedicating their expertise exclusively to patients and are free from significant conflicts of interest 
involving.) However, a cost-oriented set of guidelines would entail more than purely patient interests, thus 
creating potential conflicts of interest in physicians’ role as an advocate for patients and physicians’ role as 
an advocate for public cost-control policy. 
41 NGC/NQMC Editorial Board: Richard C. Hermann et al., Expert Commentaries: Promoting Transparent 
and Actionable Clinical Practice Guidelines: Viewpoint from the National Guideline 
Clearinghouse/National Quality Measures Clearinghouse (NGC/NQMC), National Guideline Clearing 
House (Dec 20, 2010), http://www.guideline.gov/expert/expert-commentary.aspx?id=24556   15 
conflicting guidelines, which further creates more confusion and difficulty in guideline 
application.
42 
 
Third, probably the most controversial and influential issue of evidence-based guidelines 
is whether the guidelines should serve as the legal standard of care in medical malpractice 
cases.  This issue involves an interdisciplinary dialogue between law and medicine, and 
in  the  following  pages,  I  will  clarify  the  purposes,  standards,  and  influences  of  the 
medical-malpractice system before identifying the guidelines’ important roles. 
 
II. Standard of Care in Medical Malpractice 
 
 
A.  Professional Negligence and Custom 
 
Among the four tenets required to establish a tort claim, namely, duty, breach, causation, 
and injury, the issue of breaching a standard of care is usually the threshold question in 
medical malpractice cases.
43  In most jurisdictions, when determining the standard of care 
for professionals, the courts give custom the conclusive weight. As a result, if a defendant 
physician  proves  that  what  he  or  she  has  done  is  in  consistent  with  the  generally 
recognized and accepted practice in the medical profession, the court will find no breach 
                                                        
42 Rosoff, supra note 8, 332-336. (Rosoff suggests that the problem of conflicting CPGs will only shift the 
current battle of expert testimony in courts from a “battle of experts” into a “battle of super experts,” and 
allows courts to decide which guideline-generating organization is entitled to more respect). 
43 Troyen A. Brennan, Tort Law as It Applies to Medical Malpractice Litigation, LEGAL ASPECTS OF 
MEDICINE: INCLUDING CARDIOLOGY, PULMONARY MEDICINE, AND CRITICAL CARE 
MEDICINE 23 (J.R. Vevaina et al. eds., 1989)   16 
in the duty of care, and jury is prohibited from rejecting such practice as improper.
44  This 
standard  is  often  referred  to  as  “customary  care”  or  the  “professional  community 
standard,” in contrast to the “reasonableness standard” in ordinary negligence cases.
45  
For example, in Johnson v. Riverside Anesthesia Associates, P.C.
46, the Supreme Court 
of Georgia rules that: 
 
“It  is  axiomatic  that  in  order  to  establish  medical  malpractice,  “the  evidence 
presented by the patient must show a violation of the degree of care and skill 
required  of  a  physician.    Such  standard  of  care  is  that  which,  under similar 
conditions  and  like  circumstances,  is  ordinarily  employed  by  the  medical 
profession generally.”  Thus, in medical malpractice actions, “[t]he applicable 
standard of care is that employed by the medical profession generally and not 
what one individual doctor thought was advisable and would have done under the 
circumstances.””  
 
There are several reasons supporting the judicial deference to the collective wisdom of 
the medical profession.  First, because a medical decision requires expertise, knowledge, 
and experience that are generally beyond the layperson’s abilities, it is difficult for juries 
to decide what a reasonable physician should have done under circumstances similar to 
                                                        
44 Mello, supra note 17, at 656, 657. (In tort law generally, a defendant’s compliance with custom is not 
dispositive if there is a negligence claim. Medical malpractice law, however, has evolved somewhat 
differently); FURROW ET AL, supra note 6, at 361; Clarence Morris, Custom and Negligence, 42 
COLUM. L. REV. 1147, 1147, 1158 (1942). 
45 The reasonableness standard requires “the degree of care that a reasonable person of ordinary prudence 
would have exercised under the same or similar circumstances.” See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 283 (1965); For a detailed introduction of professional custom standard, see JOHN C. 
GOLDBERG, TORT LAW: RESPONSIBILITIES AND REDRESS 171-188 (2
nd ed. 2008) 
46 275 Ga. 240, 563 S.E.2d 431 (Ga., 2002)   17 
those that the juries are considering.
47  Second, the characteristics of professionalism and 
disinterestedness arise, at least in perceptions, from the patient-physician relationship; 
thereby  distinguishing  medical  practitioners  from  profit  seekers,  and  thus  justifying 
assertions that the medical profession deserves to regulate itself. 
48 
 
One thing worth mentioning is that the level of care that courts require a given doctor to 
exhibit need not be the highest possible level, but should reflect the same level of care, 
skill,  and  diligence  that  is  ordinarily  possessed  and  exercised,  under  similar 
circumstances,  by  the  typical  member  of  the  doctor’s  profession.    For  example,  in 
Pittman v. Stevens
49 the court rules that the duty of care is  
  
“A physician…is required to provide his patients with that same degree of care, 
skill  and  diligence  which  would  be  provided  by  a  minimally  competent, 
reasonably prudent physician  in  the  same  general  field  of  practice,  under  the 
same or similar circumstances, and who has available to him the same general 
facilities, resources and options.”  
 
As a result, the determination of medical custom is a question of fact, and juries depend 
heavily on the testimony of medical experts to render decisions.  An expert is supposed to 
testify about what others in the profession commonly would do in such a situation rather 
                                                        
47 Supra note 45. 
48 Tim Cramm, Arthur J. Hartz, and Michael D. Green, Ascertaining Customary Care in Malpractice 
Cases: Asking those who know, 37 Wake Forest Law Review 699, 702 (2002). 
49 Pittman v. Stevens, 364 S.C. 337 (2005).   18 
than what he or she thinks should have been done.
50  In addition, a majority of experts 
will  refer  to  clinical  literature,  research  findings,  and  the  Physicians  Desk  Reference 
(PDR) to support his or her testimony,
51 and some courts even make it a requirement.
52 
 
B.  Reasonable Physician Standard 
Although customary practice remains the legal standard for malpractice in many states, 
almost  half  of  the  states  have  adopted  an  objective  “reasonable  physician  standard” 
instead.
53  Under this standard, a physician should possess and exercise the skill and care 
that a reasonable physician under the same or similar circumstances would possess and 
exercise, and such inquiry becomes a question of law instead of a question of fact.
54  
Therefore, the reasonable physician standard gives judges and juries more latitude in 
reviewing customs and relevant medical knowledge when deciding what the applicable 
standard should be.
55 
 
This shift in standards stems mainly from (1) the public’s general distrust of letting a 
profession set its own standards and (2) problems associated with expert testimony.  For 
one  thing,  plaintiffs  often  have  difficulty  obtaining  expert  testimony  owing  to  the 
“conspiracy of silence,” according to which few experts in a given field would be willing 
                                                        
50 Rosoff, supra note 8, at 332; Johnson v. Riverside Anesthesia Associates, P.C, 275 Ga. 240, 563 S.E.2d 
431 (Ga., 2002)  
51 Travers v. District of Columbia, 672 A.2d (D.C.App. 1996) 
52 FURROW ET AL., supra note 6, at 339-40 
53 Michael D. Greenberg, Medical Malpractice and New Devices: Defining an Elusive Standard of Care, 19 
Health Matrix 423, 428 (2009); Philip G. Peters, Jr., The Quiet Demise of Deference to Custom: 
Malpractice Law at the Millennium, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 163, 187-88 (2000). 
54 See Ande v. Rock, 256 Wis. 2d 365, 377, 647 N.W. 2d 265, 271 (Ct. App. 2002). 
55 Greenberg, supra note 53, at 429.   19 
to testify against their peers.
56  For another thing, the reliance on expert testimony to 
ascertain medical customs is problematic because an expert, even as a practitioner, often 
has no actual knowledge about how the majority of doctors practice medicine.
57  Most of 
these experts rely on their personal experience or theoretical assumptions about what is 
reasonable or what they, as experts, would have done under the same circumstances.
58  
However,  the  greatest  concern  about  reasonable  physician  standard  is  that  it  might 
migrate toward ideal care and, thus, might place an unpractical and unreasonable burden 
on physicians.  The most representative case is the 1974 Helling v. Carey,
59 in which the 
Washington  Supreme  Court  imposed  its  own  risk-benefit  judgment  and  held  that  a 
customary practice did not meet the reasonable care standard.  However, the decision in 
this case came under considerable criticism for being radical and excessively aggressive. 
Indeed, Washington courts are considered atypical in comparison with most states.
60  
 
To conclude, the standard of care in medical malpractice cases is still a diversified and 
unsettled issue among states.  Although the standard of care has evolved from “customary 
care” to a “reasonable physician” standard, most courts are still unwilling to allow a 
plaintiff  to  attack  a  customary  practice  with  which  a  defendant  physician  complied, 
                                                        
56 Largey v. Rothman, 540 A.2d 504 (N.J. 1988) (The court reasoned that “a professional standard if totally 
subject to the whim of the physicians in the particular community, and under such review a physician is 
vested with virtually unlimited discretion…and such standard has created problems for patients trying to 
find physicians willing to breach the “community of silence” by testifying against fellow colleagues.) 
57 Cramm et al, supra note 48. (Evidence shows that most physicians don’t know how their peers practice 
medicine. Cramm, Hartz and Green identify three studies illustrating that expert witnesses often lack the 
ability to empirically identify actual customs. Most expert witnesses determine the standard of care 
according to what they, themselves, would have done under the same circumstances and assume that 
customary care is similar.)  
58 Id. at 700. 
59 Helling v. Carey, 83 Wash. 2d 514 (1974). 
60 Mello, supra note 17, at 658-60.   20 
except  under  rare  circumstances.
61   Several  scholars  have  emphasized  the  value  of 
medical custom: for instance, Professor Richard Lempert argued that customary standard 
can work as a relief valve, especially when customary care lags behind reasonable care.
62 
 
C.  Duty to Stay Abreast 
Besides the duty to possess knowledge and skill and to exercise care according to the 
standard of care, there is the duty to stay abreast.  With the rapid advances in medical 
technology and knowledge, it is reasonable for courts to expect the standard of care to 
progress  in  accordance  with  these  other  advances.    Under  this  duty,  a  physician  is 
required to be aware of evolving practices in medical care, and to make appropriate use 
of new scientific knowledge in medicine as it emerges.
63 
 
However, although has evolved in the field of judicial decision-making, the duty to stay 
abreast remains largely undefined.  As Williams points out, “The current doctrine does 
little to explain to a physician what he/she must to do to keep up because courts define 
the duty in vague terms and there is little case law to inform physicians of what exactly it 
means to ‘stay abreast.’”
64 
                                                        
61 Burton v. Brooklyn Doctor Hospital, 88 A.D.2d 217, 452 N.Y.S 2d 875 (1982). 
62 Richard Lempert, Following the Man on the Clapham Omnibus: Social Science Evidence in Malpractice 
Litigation, 37 Wake Forest Rev. 903 (2002), see FURROW ET AL., supra note 6, at 337-38. 
63 In Klisch v. Meritcare Medical Group, Inc., 134 F.3d 1356 (1998), the 8
th Circuit Court held that juries 
should consider the state of medical technology at the time of the given allegedly negligent medical event 
in order to determine the appropriateness of that event. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 6, at 338. 
64 Carter L. Williams, Evidence-based Medicine in the Law Beyond Clinical Practice Guidelines: What 
Effect Will EBM Have on the Standard of Care?, 61 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 479, 513-14 (2004).    21 
 
 
III. The Role of Evidence-based Guidelines in Standards of Care 
 
The use of evidence-based guidelines in determining standards of care is tempting for 
courts as well as for litigants.  For courts, the most authoritative standards derive not 
from  costly  expert  testimony  but  from  evidence-based  guidelines—proposed  by  the 
medical profession itself and based supposedly on solid scientific evidence and expert 
consensus.  Patient plaintiffs look with a suspicious eye on a physician’s deviation from 
explicit  guidelines,  and  thus  an  inculpatory  neglect  of  guidelines  can  simplify  the 
plaintiffs’  task  of  proving  other  forms  of  negligence.
65   Defendant  physicians  would 
likely find that their compliance with guidelines could work as a strong defense against 
accusations  of  negligence,  thus  minimizing—if  not  eliminating—the  fear  many 
physicians  have  of  litigation,  and  making  the  practice  of  medicine  more  predictable.  
However, such reasoning might be too straightforward and ideal.  
 
A.  Guidelines as Standards of Care 
Argument could be made that evidence-based guidelines should bear conclusive weight 
regarding standard of care; however, neither the medical profession nor courts welcome 
such ideas.  The medical profession strongly opposes the idea, arguing that evidence-
                                                        
65 See Hyams A. et al., Medical Practice Guidelines in Malpractice Litigation: an Early Retrospective, 21 
Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law 289-313 (1996). (Studies show that plaintiffs have a more 
frequent use of CPGs and such uses have a positive correlation to the success rate for plaintiffs in the 
litigation.)   22 
based  guidelines  are  merely  suggestions  for  better  medical  practices.
66   Holding  the 
guidelines up as standards of care and characterizing any departure from these guidelines 
as an act of negligence not only impose a tremendous burden on physicians but also 
penalize physicians’ efforts, made in good will, to improve on existing practices.  Such 
consequences could have chilling effects that would, so the argument goes, undermine 
evidence-based guidelines.
67  
 
In addition, courts are cautious when considering the use of clinical practice guidelines as 
standards of care.
68  In Hinlicky v. Dreyfuss,
69 the court explicitly ruled that even though 
the clinical practice guidelines had been admitted as evidence, they did not constitute—in 
themselves—standards of care.
70  The court also refused the argument that the Physicians 
Desk Reference (PDR) constitutes prima facie evidence of the standard of care, and rules 
that although PDR could have some significance in identifying a doctor’s standard of 
care, but it could not be determinative.  The reasoning that rejects PDR as standard of 
care could be used to predict courts’ attitude toward evidence-based guidelines because 
PDR is a type of guideline as well.  Moreover, a fundamental rationale against such idea 
might be, a straight application of evidence-based guidelines as a standard of care would 
                                                        
66 Rosoff, supra note 8, at 331 (In the short runs, the adoption of evidence-based medicine by courts can 
generate more cost than benefits.) 
67 Williams, supra note 64, at 484.  
68 FURROW ET AL., supra note 6, at 349. 
69 Hinlicky v. Dreyfuss 6 N.Y.3d 636, 816 N.Y.S.2d 908, 848 N.E.2d 1285 (2006) 
70 The physician defendant argued that he had followed a set of clinical guidelines published in 1996 by the 
American Heart Association (AHA) in association with the American College of Cardiology (ACC) in 
determining whether the plaintiff should have a preoperative cardiac evaluation. The trial court admitted 
the guidelines as evidence under the professional-reliability exception to the rule against hearsay. The 
Court of Appeals of New York affirmed the decision, ruling that the guideline is not admitted as evidence 
to establish a standard of care, but to illustrate the defendant’s decision-making process.   23 
be a total forfeiture of judicial power, which runs counter to the principle of checks and 
balances as a way to manage power. 
 
However,  there  were  statutory  attempts  to  permit  physicians’  exculpatory  use  of 
guidelines  as  affirmative  defenses  in  medical  malpractice  litigation  in  states  such  as 
Kentucky
71,  Florida
72and  Maine
73 in  the  1990s.    The  purposes  of  these  experimental 
statutes were to reduce the practice of defensive medicine and litigation costs as well as 
to encourage physicians to use CPGs.  As a result, the courts treat physicians’ compliance 
with certain guidelines as prima facie evidence that the physicians had substantially met a 
standard  of  care.  However,  the  effect  of  these  statutes  was  not  as  expected.
74   For 
example, empirical studies show that the Maine statutes (the Maine Project) influenced 
perhaps only about 3 to 4% of medical practice.
75  Moreover, because the statutes does 
not allow plaintiffs’ use the of guidelines as prima facie evidence for standard of care, 
scholars also criticized the statutes as unfairly favoring physicians and as unconstitutional 
                                                        
71 See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann section 342.035(8)(b), which states that “any provider of medical services under 
this chapter who has followed the practice parameters or guidelines developed or adopted pursuant to this 
subsection shall be presumed to have met the appropriate legal standard of care in medical malpractice 
cases regardless of any unanticipated complication that may thereafter develop or be discovered.” 
72 See Ash Samanta et al., The Role of Clinical Practice Guidelines in Medical Negligence Litigations: A 
Shift from the Bolam Stadard?, 14 Med. L. Rev. 321, 341 (2006). (Florida project allows the compliance 
with guidelines to constitute an affirmative defense doesn’t provide sufficient incentive for physicians to 
reduce defensive medicine.)  
73 See Gordon H. Smith, A Case Study in Progress: Practice Guidelines and the Affirmative Defense in 
Maine, 19 Joint Commission J. on Quality improvement 355, 355-61 (1993). (Maine Project is the statutory 
experiment that allows guidelines be used as an affirmative defense for physicians who volunteered to 
follow established CPGs in four specialty areas, anesthesia, emergency medicine, radiology, and obstetrics 
and gynecology, with the purpose of certainty and reducing defensive medicine.) 
74 See, Jodi M. Finder, The Future of Practice Guidelines: Should They Constitute Conclusive Evidence of 
the Standard of Care?. 10 Health Matrix 67, 104-106 (2000). (Finder points out three obstacles hindering 
the Maine Project: (1) the legislation did not preclude the possibility of lengthy litigation, (2) it denied 
plaintiffs’ right to a jury trial and the use of evidence regarding guidelines, and (3) the creation of 
guidelines might not be reliable.)  
75 Supra note 64, at 361.   24 
violating patient’s right of due process or equal protection of law.
76  As a result, there is a 
general consensus about guidelines should not constitute a de facto legal standard that is 
applied rigidly in every case.
77 
 
B.  Guidelines as Evidence of Medical Custom 
Guidelines serve to help standardize physicians’ behavior for the betterment of medical 
practices.
78  With proper dissemination, such guidelines could integrate themselves into 
clinical practices and become medical custom.  As a result, even when not having a 
dispositive  effect,  guidelines  could  serve  as  evidence  to  identify  medical  custom  in 
courtrooms.  However, the biggest problem with this overall assessment of guidelines is 
that, up to the present, this integration process is far from complete. 
 
Many scholars have pointed out that the disparity between guidelines and current medical 
practices is the biggest concern regarding the use of guidelines as evidence of customary 
care.  In a widely cited article “Of Sword and Shields: The Role of Clinical Practice 
Guidelines in Medical Malpractice Litigation” in 2001, Mello suggests that a majority of 
CPGs  do  not  represent  the  prevailing  medical  practice,  and  that  “there  exists  little 
agreement as to whether CPGs represent a minimum baseline, a not-yet-attained ideal, or 
a customary practice that lies somewhere between these two extremes.“
79  Her argument 
still  stands  true  today.    In  August  2007,  the  Society  of  American  Gastrointestinal 
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Endoscopic Surgeons (SAGES) conducted an electronic survey of its members about 
their use of SAGES-suggested guidelines, and the survey shows that only 50% of the 
respondents used the guidelines.
80  In addition, Timmers and Muack observed that for 
most of the practitioners, guidelines constituted only an option instead of a true standard 
and  that  practitioners’  use  of  these  guidelines  was  widely  discretionary,  in  effect 
rendering the guidelines inadequate to the task of effectively changing clinical care.
81  As 
a result, courts should be aware that even though a guideline is generally recognized as a 
good practice, it might not function as an integrated component of general practice.  
 
Moreover,  a  great  number  of  cost-oriented  guidelines  have  significantly  complicated 
efforts to standardize care.  Even if a cost-oriented guideline has integrated itself into 
general practice and become medical custom, a departure from such guidelines does not 
necessarily mean that the physician has substandard care, skills, and diligence.  Instead, 
such a departure at most shows doctors who render decisions that are not cost-efficient. 
For example, Columbia University conducted an institutional review between 2005-2007 
among 1,402 female patients who underwent gynecologic surgery.  The results show that 
95 % of the patients underwent all of the guideline-recommended preoperative testing, 
yet  90%  of  them  underwent  at  least  1  non-indicated  preoperative  test.  Of  the  tests 
conducted, about 30% were in accordance with evidence-based guidelines.  The research 
concludes that adherence to evidence-based recommendations for preoperative testing is 
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poor,  and  that  such  inappropriate  preoperative  tests  led  to  direct  costs  of  more  than 
$418,000.
82  
 
As we see in this research, departure from a guideline could result in “over-treating” 
instead of “under-treating.”  However, every treatment carries certain inherent risks that 
are inevitable even when conducted by doctors who exercise their best knowledge and 
skill.  Consider a situation where risk-averse doctors recommend a procedure on the basis 
of their medical judgment even though the guidelines recommend against the procedure, 
and despite the doctors’ utmost care, the patients suffer harm from the procedure.  One 
can argue that the physician’s over-treating decision exposes the patient to unnecessary 
potentially harmful risks for which physicians should be responsible.  However, it is also 
arguable that the doctors should not be held liable for their risk-averse approach simply 
because it clashes with the guidelines that is reflective of cost-reduction preferences or 
resource limitations.  In this scenario, the doctor may just be fighting for his professional 
judgment of what is optimal for his/her patient’ benefits against a system-wide decision 
about  what  is  optimal  for  most  patients,  which  differs  from  the  scenario  of  careless 
doctors that medical malpractice system intends to capture.  However, if we uniformly 
treat earnest departures from guidelines as careless departures from standard of care, 
doctors would likely be liable for their choices.  
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C.  Guidelines as Evidence of Respectable Minorities 
Even though a guideline may not faithfully reflect medical custom, it could act as strong 
evidence for respectable alternative approaches.  Recognizing the diversity of treatments 
and approaches in medicine, the courts have adopted the “respectable minority doctrine” 
(or the “two schools of thought” doctrine) to allow a physician to choose an accepted 
alternative  treatment  that  differs  from  majority  practice  but  is  recognized  by  a 
considerable number of respected professionals so long as the doctor in question acts not 
out of negligence but in the best interests of his or her patients.
83  An evidence-based 
guideline lends its credibility and authority to a respectable alternative approach, which 
has its special value in the cases of new medical devices and treatments.  Physicians often 
are hesitant about adopting new medical devices because the potential departure from 
customary  practice  might  entail  malpractice  liability  risks.
84   However,  if  a  newly 
developed  medical  device  is  recognized  and  accommodated  in  a  evidence-based 
guideline, courts can be better able to apply the respectable minority doctrine, thereby 
further encouraging physicians to adopt new devices by reducing liability concerns. 
 
D.     Guidelines as Evidence of Reasonable Care or the Duty to Stay Abreast 
Medical professionals, courts, and society as a whole share the desire for better medical 
practice.  However, this general consensus does not mean that courts, in determining 
malpractice liability, must hold medical professionals to every standard to which they 
hold  themselves.    Tort  liability  is  a  powerful  tool  in  allocating  loss  and  creating 
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deterrence to encourage future compliance, but it should be used with great caution.  As a 
matter of fact, courts have long been cautious when using standards of care to evaluate 
whether there has been wrongdoing by average individuals as well as by professionals; 
indeed, the requirement is not that such individuals exercise extraordinary skills and care, 
but  that  the  individuals  meet  a  threshold  of  minimum  competence  acceptable  to  the 
society.
85 
 
Courts’  use  of  evidence-based  guidelines  as  evidence  to  establish  reasonable  care 
standards or as the basis of the duty to stay abreast creates concerns similar to those 
characterizing the argument that courts should not treat these guidelines as standards of 
care per se in Part A.  The chief concern is that the aggressive interpretation of the 
desirable standard encouraged by guidelines into the legal reasonable care standard could 
trigger  radical  changes  to  current  medical  practices.    Moreover,  even  when  using 
guidelines only as evidence for standards of care, a court still runs the risk of changing 
guidelines’  aspirational  characteristic,  which  is  essential  to  the  guidelines’  proper 
functioning.  
 
The  aspirational  characteristic  of  evidence-based  guidelines  aims  at  preserving  each 
practitioner’s clinical autonomy, mitigating the concerns of cookbook medicine.
86  The 
practice  of  medicine  has  been  referred  to  as  a  mix  of  science  and  art  because  the 
uncertainty is so omnipresent that science alone cannot manage medicine.  For example, 
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the  uncertainty  caused  by  each  patient’s  different  health  conditions  and  reactions  to 
treatments shows the continuous need for medical professionals to observe and adjust 
during the course of treatment, and this is mainly accomplished by doctors’ experience 
and professional judgment.  As a result, when a guideline is created, it is intended to 
accommodate such diversity and flexibility, thus functioning more as guidance rather 
than as a set of mandates.  As Eddy points out, the flexibility is inherent in guidelines and 
is the necessary tradeoff when guiding the decision making in a number of similar cases 
rather than in a single one.
87  However, holding a guideline as evidence for standards of 
care  might  twist  such  flexibility  and  aspiration  characteristic,  leaving  little  room  for 
professional judgment.  
 
Furthermore, the evidence use of guidelines tends to deepen the misperception of error-
free medicine.
88  The idea of a standardized process seems to simplify decision-making 
and  makes  any  departure  from  the  standard  more  blamable.    However,  as  Gawande 
observed, “medicine today has become the art of managing extreme complexity—and a 
test of whether such complexity can, in fact, be humanly mastered.”
89  With the ever-
changing  pace  of  scientific  advances  in  medical  knowledge  and  medical  products, 
guidelines at most, work only as the tool that allows doctors to barely keep up with such 
advances, instead of, to have a complete command of errors.  Human beings are not 
flawless. We are blessed with emotion and reason, and we make mistakes.  Guidelines 
help doctors to reduce mistakes, but it is not the elixir for error-free medicine.  However, 
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the use of guidelines could create a stereotype that the practice of medicine is more 
standardized and simple.  
 
Last  but  not  least,  overly  demanding  standards  of  care  not  only  invite  more  costly 
malpractice litigation but also can undermine a doctor’s passion for medicine.  Most 
doctors still believe Hippocrates ‘s famous admonition “first, do no harm, ” and try to 
honor this belief in day-to-day practice.  However, many doctors lose their passion for 
medicine after undergoing the traumatizing experience of a malpractice lawsuit.  The 
resulting  social  pressures  and  damage  to  professional  image  are  two  key  factors 
contributing  to  declines  in  doctors’  enthusiasm  for  their  practice.
90   Guidelines  are 
supposed  to  elevate  healthcare  quality  as  a  whole,  rather  than  simply  weed  out 
incompetent or negligent professionals.  When used aggressively to judge a practitioner’s 
behavior, guidelines could become excessive and can result in unfair allocations of losses 
imposed by malpractice liability.  Last but not least, the most deleterious side effect 
might be both the value we destroy when we drive practitioners out of practice and when 
we squander societies’ investment in medical professionals.  
 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
The main purposes of this paper are to identify and to analyze (1) differences between 
medical standards and legal standards of care, and (2) the difficulty of integrating the 
former into the latter.  In my opinion, the courts should be cautious while facing the 
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temptation to use evidence-based guidelines as standards of care.  On the one hand, even 
though the development of evidence-based guidelines is widely recognized as desirable 
and valuable, it is still an evolving category that contains miscellaneous standards with 
different purposes, different strengths, and unclear influences relative to current medical 
practices, and is not easily unified into a single set of standards.  On the other hand, 
courts will encounter great difficulty when attempting to use these guidelines to boost 
better medical practice because such radical interpretation of standard of care by courts is 
inconsistent with judicial passivity, and may have chilling effects on guideline creation, 
or at least can put impractical burdens on medical professionals.  
 
However, courts cannot be indifferent to what is happening in the medical profession 
either.  My suggestion is that, under certain qualifications, evidence-based guidelines can 
shed more light than expert testimony on standard of care, both on medical custom or 
reasonable physician standards.
91  When a guideline is based on scientific evidence and 
expert consensus, it trumps individual experts in terms of accessibility and neutrality and 
is  worthier  of  courts’  trust  than  is  expert  testimony.
92   Although  guidelines  will  not 
replace individual experts because the application of guidelines to certain cases is still a 
process need professional judgment, yet it is desirable for both parties to use guidelines to 
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impugn  or  strengthen  an  individual  expert’s  opinion,  thus  facilitating  fact  finding  in 
courtrooms.
93  Nevertheless, courts should play a gate-keeping role in the admittance of 
guidelines with the following qualifications.  
 
First  of  all,  courts  should  be  aware  whether  the  guideline  at  issue  represents  current 
medical  practice  or  an  expectation  for  better  practice.
94   Courts  can  look  at  the 
dissemination circumstances of guidelines by looking at empirical studies or consulting 
medical experts and administrators in healthcare institutions to determine.  Second, courts 
should recognize the purposes of evidence-based guidelines, and should especially filter 
out the cost-oriented guidelines created by third-party payers.  On the one had, penalizing 
a doctor with malpractice liability for rendering a non-“cost efficient” decision might 
violate  the  proportionality  principle  and  is  inconsistent  with  the  purpose  of  medical 
malpractice  liability.    On  the  other  hand,  physicians  should  not  be  able  to  cite  their 
compliance  with  a  cost-oriented  guideline  to  justify  negligence.
95   In  contrast,  the 
guidelines generated by professional associations or impartial third-party organizations 
are permissible because these guidelines tend to have a significant focus on patients’ 
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health and because doctors’ compliance with these guidelines is closely correlated with 
what we expect from good medical practice.  
 
Last but not least, Courts must keep in mind that it is powerful to use malpractice liability 
to implement guidelines and shape physicians’ behaviors, but it also places a stranglehold 
on individual physicians’  professional  judgments.    Moreover,  courts  should  avoid 
allowing  an  evidence-based  guideline,  especially  when  it  is  different  from  accepted 
current practice, to directly influence standards of care without analyzing the possible 
consequence.  Otherwise, a court will incur the risks of endowing an aspirational standard 
with the compelling legal power, and overstepping its passive judicial role to guarantee 
and  to  promote  a  single  standard  as  a  universal  desirable  medical  practice,  which  is 
against the choice made by the medical profession as a whole to keep evidence-based 
guidelines as aspirational.  
 